Th e article describes the changes in the president's position in Albania over the years, starting with the democratic transition in the early 1990s. Th e work consists of three elements: (1) theoretical framework about measuring presidential power and institutionalization of the president (2) the Presidential competence index provided by T. Frye (3) the analysis of the reasons for the presidency implementation in Albania. Th e author considered two Constitutions acts that were valid in a given moment. Th e paper takes into consideration the analysis of legal (constitutional) factors that infl uenced the destabilization of political systems emerging in post-communist countries according to Frye Index.
Introduction
Th e aim of the paper is to indicate the extent of the changes in the scope of presidential power that occurred in Albania during the transformation process. In this work, the author draws attention to the issue of strong political leadership, which is, on the one hand, a tempting solution in the face of charismatic leadership, but on the other it is a very serious threat to the functioning of the emerging political systems.
Th e above work tries to answer the questions: (1) How did the adoption of the new Constitutions in Albania in 1998 change the position of the president? (2) How does the Frye Index refl ect the political changes in Albania aft er 1997? (3) In what way was the institution of the presidency implemented into Albanian law?
In order to analyse the president's powers, the author will use modifi ed Frye Index (Frye T., 1997) . It has to be mentioned that the use of this tool is risky, since it is focused only on constitutional regulations but not on the actual infl uence capabilities of the presidential institution. Frye distinguished twenty-seven prerogatives of the state taking into account the specifi c nature of the post-Soviet region. (Frye T., 1997) .
Data used in analysis was two constitutions valid in Albania. Th e fi rst document, analyzed in terms of the position of the President, is the Act of 29 April 1991 Law on the Major Constitutional Provisions (see at: http://www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/interim-consti-4(1) /2016 tution-albania-1991-1998) . Th e original text covered only basic systemic regulations. It was supposed to be a sign that the law was only temporary. Th e Constitutional Act of 1991 was amended six times. Important in this context was Act 7558 of April 9, 1992 which clearly extended the powers of the president (Bosiacki A., 1997, p. 15) .
Th e second document, analyzed in terms of the president's position, was the Constitution enacted on 21 October 1998 and approved in the referendum on 22 November of at the same year (see at: http://www.osce.org/albania/41888). It took place aft er the resignation of Sali Berisha and aft er the socialists took power. It was signifi cant in limiting the president's prerogatives to those mentioned explicitly in the Constitution and other acts in conformity with the Constitution (Article 94) Th e analysis characteristics should indicate that time frames should be clearly defi ned. Th e use of two existing Albanian constitutions additionally specifi es the time range of work for [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . However, the introduction of the institution of the president to Albanian politics began a bit earlier, with a marked increase in the importance of social unrest in Albania aft er death of Hoxha. On the other hand the analysis of the subsequent constitution should not fi nish at the time of its adoption, but rather extend to the period of stabilization in the country at the end of 20 th century and the beginning of the 21 st century.
Th eoretical Framework
Albania was founded on a few signifi cant works. Albania From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity (Vickers, Pettifer 1997) and Th e Albanian Question. Reshaping the Balkans (Pettifer J., Vickers M., 2007) are two signifi cant research papers of Albania's problems during the transformation process. Work of Elez Biberaj (Biberaj E., 1999) also describes the Albanian situation in those times. Th e fi rst modern Polish work to analyze the history of Albania was by J. Hauziński and J. Leśny (Hauziński J., Leśny J., 1992) Th e works of T. Czekalski on both history (Czekalski T., et al. 2009 , also Czekalski T. 1998 ) as well as his work about transformation in Albania in the 1990s (Czekalski T., 2003) are invaluable sources of information. More contemporary works of Przemysław Żukiewicz (Żukiewicz 2015) are good examples of analysis of the Albanian political situation. So far many papers dealing with issues related to the presidential system have appeared. It is possible for Elgie (Elgie, 2005) to designate at least three diff erent stages of the presidential debate. Th e fi rst stage is related to the classical Linz theory, which argued that the parliamentary system was more effi cient than the presidential one. He emphasized the fact that direct presidential elections cause the presidents to usurp the greater power as representatives of the whole nation. Th is debate was characterized by the presence of one explanatory variable (the type of regime) and one dependent variable (the success of democratic consolidation). Th e answer to Linz's theory was the so-called second stage, which was arguments put forward by Mainwaring (1993) and Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) . According to these researchers, the problem was not only related to the president himself, but also to the combination of the presidential system and the strong defragmentation of the party system, resulting in the failure of the legislature. Th e second phase introduced into the analysis more than one explanatory variable (egg. regime type, the party system, leadership powers, political practice and the electoral system) and diff erent dependant variables (good governance generally as opposed to democratic consolidation). Th e most controversial third phase of the debate is the oft en-discussed presidential agenda, with many clearly defi ned analytical methods such as the Veto Player (Tsebelis, 2002), rational choice institutionalism and the principal-agent theory (Strøm, 2000) . Th ird-phase research is characterized by a critical approach to previous approaches and a multitude of empirical research into the functioning of presidential systems. Th e results of these studies show that it is possible to implement appropriate policies without disturbing the functioning of the democratic order.
Th e concentration of power in a political system is a quite known problem. Considerations of the position of a single political actor are the subject of various studies. Th e phenomenon of the increasing importance of individual politicians is becoming increasingly visible. Th is process is oft en called the presidentialisation of politics. It does not necessarily aff ect the presidential offi ce itself. Direct elections and the lack of a possibility of dismissing the president are the indispensable determinant of the presidency (Lijphart 2008) . Th is phenomenon aff ects stable democracies as well as transitional states. While in established democracies the check-and-balance mechanisms are suffi ciently well-established to prevent abuse of power, in states where political systems are still building, there are numerous degenerations, oft en leading to usurpation by individual actors of almost absolute power. Th e presidentialisation of politics starts, on the one hand, in the changes associated with shift ing the expectations of the electorate towards strong leadership and, on the other, in the increasing autonomy of the president towards the political parties sitting in the parliament.
Among the diff erent methods of examining the position of the president, two basic groups of methods can be distinguished. Th e fi rst one to repeat Fortin (2012) is the method proposed by Shugart and Carrey (1992) and modifi ed by Metcalf (2000) . In this measurement method the president's powers are divided into 10 categories, each of which is rated on a scale ranging between 0-4. Each category belongs to two groups, legislatives prerogatives and non-legislative prerogatives. Researchers using this type of instrument, on the basis of the prerogatives exercised, determine how the head of state fulfi ls the individual tasks and the possibilities and then determines how many points the president gains. Th e next step is to sum up points for the overall strength and position of the president.
Th e second approach lists the potential president powers. Th e composition of the list depends on the particular researcher. For example, Siaroff (2003) proposed a list of 9 permissions. Th e more complicated lists were written by Frye (1997 ) -27 allowances and Lucky C. (1993 -1994 ) -38 allowances. Th e Presidents earns the appropriate number of points, depending on in which authority s/he can act independently (1 point), in consultation with another state body (.5 points), and in which there is no possibility of infl uence (0 points). Aft er identifying the number of points scored in each act, it should be added up to determine the position of the president.
To analyze the position of the president in the light of the two constitutions in force in Albania, the author will use a modifi ed Frye index. Th e use of this method seems appropriate for the purpose of the study, namely to analyze the infl uence of the leadership of the president on factors destabilizing the political system in Albania. However, this type of tool seems to be most suitable for comparing two diff erent legal acts in the same country, due to the same weighting of the individual points of analysis. Many of the powers were extended by the head of state and have their background in extra-constitutional matters. Th us, capture of these powers would be diffi cult. In addition, many of the powers were unconstitutional but during the 1991 Constitution, it did not preclude them from being implemented in the political sphere by the President.
According to the Frye Index, for the exclusive right president receives 1 point. For the privilege shared with other state organs 0.5 point and for lack of prerogative get 0 points. Th e obtained points should be totalled and compared with the other results. To make the result easier to compare, the author has extracted a percentage of the obtained scores from the analysis of particular legislation in relation to the total number of points. Th anks to such an approach, one can get a clear picture of the comparison of the President's position and the strength that the body had under the conditions of a particular Constitution.
Using the Frye Index, two constitutional arrangements in Albania aft er 1991 should be compared. Of course, it should be noted that there is no way of accurately specifying how the actual role of the president in Albania looked -especially during the 1991 constitution. Albania during the presidency of Sali Berisha was a country with a facade of democratic solutions and many of the powers were implied and unspoken. In addition, the president wished to maintain the perception of the power being as wide as possible. It was related to the fact that many of the powers were not directly indicated in the constitution. For better understanding, the author presents the following rights ( Table 1 ) that are included in the Frye index. Th e Frye Index has been modifi ed by removing such powers as calling an election, as it is a merely technical activity. Th e appointing of judges, offi cers and senior commanders, was removed because at least in the fi rst period, there was a complete replacement of the judiciary and the offi cer corps, which was dictated by radical decommunization. Special powers in situations where the parliament can not gather have also been removed because they have never been used in Albania.
Analysis of the President's position in the light of constitutional regulations according to the Frye index
Frye's fi rst indicator of the president's position is the possibility of dissolving the parliament. According to the 1991 constitution, the President could dissolve the parliament aft er consultation with the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the chairman of the Presidency of the People's Assembly (Chapter III, Article 28, paragraph 9). Th e next determinant is the possibility of calling a referendum. Th e constitution confers this right only to the Assembly but the President may ask the People's Assembly to issue a referendum (Chapter III, Article 28, paragraph 4). Consequently, his formal power in this matter was small and the decision was not his but it must be borne in mind, that the Assembly was dominated by the group from which the President originated. Th erefore, he could exert pressure on the Assembly to hold a referendum. Th e next indicator is the possibility of calling elections. In Chapter III, Article 28, paragraph 3, the President shall determine the date of the election. Th e entitlement shall be either with the possibility of dissolving the parliament or with the expiry the term of Assembly.
Another determinant is the appointment of the prime minister. Th e president has no restrictions here and could appoint according to his own choice. On the other hand, the election, dismissal or dismissal of government members, the president makes the request that the prime minister submits this decree for approval to the People's Assembly in its next meeting. (Chapter III, Article 28, paragraphs 6 and 7). In addition, in accordance with the provisions of the 1991 Constitutional Act, the President was obliged to elect 4 members of the Constitutional Court and requested the Assembly to elect the chairman and deputy chairmen of the Supreme Court. (Chapter IIIa, Article 6 and Chapter IIIa, Article 18). Judges were appointed by the Supreme Judicial Council, the body headed by the President of the Republic, so his participation in appointing judges of the fi rst instance courts was essential (Chapter VI, Article 15).
Th e Attorney General and his deputy were elected by People's Assembly but at the demand of the President (Chapter VI, Article 14, Paragraph 1). According to the above Constitution, the President was Th e Supreme Commander of Armed Forces and Chairman of the Defence Council. Th e People's Assembly elected Members of the Defence Council at the request of the President (Chapter III of Article 32). Th e Constitution does not explicitly regulate the appointment of offi cers and commanders in the Albanian Army. Th e lack of sources makes it ambiguous to determine exactly who was responsible for the appointment of offi cers. It is certain that higher offi cers degrees were conferred by the President and that some part of the assignment was given by the Defence Council, which according to Article 32, was responsible for the organization and mobilization of all forces to defend the country At the request of the President, the Presidium of the People's Assembly could order the convening of a special session of the Assembly (Chapter II, Article 19). Th e President also possessed certain powers in extraordinary cases. For example, in situations where the Assembly could not be gathered, the President could decide on the mobilization or state of emergency, which required submission of the Assembly within fi ve days (Chapter III, Article 28); in addition, it was possible to declare the state of war. However, he did not have to present it (Chapter III, Article 28, point 18).
Th e amendment of the Constitutional Act of 9 April 1992, which extended the powers of the President, allowed him to attend government meetings and bring to the agenda issues which should be considered. Chapter III, Article 28 Paragraph 18 defi ned the manner in which the President communicates with the People's Assembly as being by means of a message read in plenary.
On the other hand, the Constitution passed over several powers of the President. It does not explicitly speak about the possibility of appointing the President of the Central Bank, but Chapter III Article 28 paragraph 8 talks about that President appointing "other central offi ces" at the request of the Prime Minister, probably also includes the President of the Bank of Albania. Th e President's participation in parliamentary sessions was also not mentioned in the constitution, however fi lling by Sali Berisha of the deciding position in the party certainly enabled it. Th e last entitlement falling within the scope of the Frye Index, which is silent on the constitution, is the possibility of convening government meetings. However the Act of 9 April 1992 created a de facto Cabinet Advice, which was created by the President. Th e president shared some prerogatives with other authorities, but in the Albanian reality of President Berisha's day (when almost all state organs were controlled by the President's PDSh), his actions were not limited in any way, and almost all decisions were made and were approved by the appropriate institutions.
An analysis of the fi rst constitution of Albania revealed that the President obtained 15.5 points out of a possible 22. Additionally the research showed that (1) straight out is 18 powers, in which the President scored 12 points with the weight 66.66 [12/18 * 100] (2) Permissions silenced by constitutions, but exercised by the president (total 4) give aft er summing up with other 15.5 points for a total of 22 allowances, which translates into a weight of 70.45 [15.5 / 22 *100] (3) Some changes were introduced by the Act of 9 April 1992 regulating the procedure for the election of the President and extending its prerogatives, for example, allowing the People's Assembly to request the organization of a popular referendum, and to create a Cabinet chaired by the President. Th is law legalized the position of then President, Sali Berisha.
In the second analyzed document, as previously mentioned, the fi rst indicator is the possibility of convening the parliament. Th e 1998 constitution imposed a specifi c condition for taking the initiative to shorten the mandate of the Assembly. It is a failure of the new prime minister aft er his resignation (Article 104 (2)). Powers in this matter are depleted and the president cannot dissolve the parliament at any time (i.e. when the Assembly is not allowed to carry out his duties to the President). Article 150 specifi es the rules for calling a referendum.
At the request of 50,000 citizens, the President could hold a referendum of special importance. Compared to the previous constitution, this reverses the possibility of referendum. In the subsequent regulations, the possibility of holding a referendum rests with the head of state and he is announcing the adoption of the law through referendum (Article 151). However, the announcement of the referendum is additionally subject to a favourable decision of the Constitutional Court. Another Presidential prerogative is the possibility of calling elections. Th e President's competence in this matter is limited to the date of the general election (i.e. Assembly, local government and referendum) (Article 92, point k) and the president has no initiative in this matter.
Th e Albanian President may appoint a prime minister at the request of a party or coalition having a majority in Parliament (Article 96). It does not fundamentally change the role of the president because, according to the earlier constitution, the prime minister elected by the president had to be accepted by the Assembly. Currently, the proposal to appoint a new prime minister comes from a parliamentary majority, which must additionally accept the proposed Cabinet. Appointment and dismissal of ministers by the President takes place at the request of the Prime Minister (article 98). Th e President appoints nine Judges of the Supreme Court with the consent of the Parliament (Article 136). Th is is an extension of competence since the earlier constitutional law regulated that the Assembly could elect judges of the Court of Cassation. On the other hand, the election of the chairman and alternates is made at the request of the President. Th e current systemic regulations give the President rights to choose all the judges, but this election is at the request of the Assembly. Similarly, is the situation of the Constitutional Court (Article 125). Other judges are appointed by the President at the request of the Supreme Judicial Council.
Th e Attorney General and his deputy are appointed by the President with the approval of the Assembly (Article 149), as in the case of a referendum reversal of roles. Another priority is to elect the President of the Central Bank (Art 161). Th e next Constitution explicitly defi ned the structure of the Bank of Albania and determined the election of the chairman of the Board of Governors or the Governor. According to the 1998 Constitution, he is elected by the Assembly, at the request of the President, for a period of 7 years.
Th e situation of the Security Council has changed, and it has become solely the advisory body of the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. On the composition and function of the Security Council see (Article 168). Th e commander of the Armed Forces during the war and the chief of staff of the General Staff are appointed by the President at the request of the Prime Minister (Article 169 (2) and (3)). Th e President may return the law for reconsideration, only once through a decree. At the same time, this decree can be repealed if it was rejected by a simple majority in the Assembly (Article 85). Th e President may refer requests for commencing proceedings to the Constitutional Court (art 134). Th e president has lost the legislative initiative (Article 81), he cannot issue decree-law, nor can he present his amendments to the Constitution (Article 177 (1)), but he has the right to request an extraordinary session of the Assembly (art 74).
During the war, when the Parliament cannot meet, the President may issue special legislative acts, approved by the Assembly at its next meeting (Articles 172 and 176).
Presidential participation in the meetings is limited to ceremonial functions, and the passive observation of events. Th e President can maintain communication with the Assembly through the offi cial message.
Th e Constitution of 1998 does not assume the existence of a body such as the Cabinet Council (organized under the chairmanship of the President). Th e Council of Ministers is headed by the Prime Minister. Council of Ministers meetings are closed, so the participation of the President is excluded.
Th is article presents an analysis using the Frye Index to the changes in the position of president in Albania. Whereas the analysis of the second constitutional act indicates that (1) Th e position of the president was clearly weakened; he was deprived of most of the powers and, from being in the dominant position in the state, he became only the executor of the provisions of the Prime Minister, the Assembly or the Nation. (2) For 22 powers, the president reached 9 points, and it is down by almost a third. Th e powers of president is more clearly illustrated on a table below, which presents the diff erences in power in accordance to the respective Albanian Constitutions (Table 2) . Numbers in square brackets are powers that was absent in 1991 Constitution, even with amendments.
Th e aforementioned data trends tend to change the position of the President in the Republic of Albania. It was related to President Berisha style of politics and his dictatorial aspirations. Socialists, who took over power on Berisha's fall, did not want to let the situation happen again and introduced changes that could prevent it. Th e president has been deprived of the opportunity to make the majority of independent decisions. Currently almost all his political decisions require being countersigned by the Prime Minister or the Assembly. President kept only three independent prerogatives, in security matters and cooperation with Constitutional Court.
Th e establishment of the President of Albania and its modifi cations
As a result of the democratic transformation in Albania enormous changes took place. Primarily, transformation was embraced in the economic and the political system. Changes did not miss the sphere of political leadership, for example in the position of head of state. In the fi rst place noticeable change had been seen in strengthening the position of the head of the state. Th e fi rst democratic Albanian president, Sali Berisha, was characterized by his dictatorial aspirations. His rule ended in a spectacular defeat aff ected by the pyramid crisis (alb. Kriza piramidale 1997). Moreover, the takeover of power by the opposition of socialist background led to gradual weakening of the president's powers, while enhancing the parliamentary power.
For a better understanding of the issue of political leadership in Albania and above all the position of the President in this country, one should pay attention to the issues connected with the institutionalization of the presidency in Albania.
In the process of formation of the Albanian Presidency, three main stages can be noted: (1) the creation of the institution of the presidency and its basic shape by the falling communist rulers in the era of transition (to the 1992 election); (2) the modifi cation (in this case, the extension) of the president's powers by the Democrats and their leader, by the constitutional majority in parliament (from 1992 until the fall of the president and the takeover of power by socialists in 1997) (3) far-reaching limitation of the scope of the authority of the President and a turning towards the stable parliamentary system by the socialists (since the adoption of the new Constitution in 1998).
Some kind of analysis of implementing the institution of the president in the new Central European democracies was suggested by B. Dziemidok-Olszewska; her analysis contains three questions (1) Why was the presidency implemented? (2) What model of the presidency was adopted? And (3) How have the powers of the Head of State been modifi ed? (Dziemidok-Olszewska B. 2003, p. 83) .
Referring to the fi rst question, in Albania there has almost always been a strong political leadership. Both historical fi gures such as Skanderbeg and more modern like King Leka I and Enver Hoxha were characters -symbols, and certainly usurped almost unlimited powers as rulers. Combined with the patriarchal clan society, this caused the need to establish a single representative of the nation. Although in Albania the concept of the president was initially unfamiliar, the need for a strong leader was conditioned by histor-4(1)/2016 ical traces. Aft er the fall of President Berisha and the restriction of the president's role, clear leadership had found exemplifi cations in the party leadership of the main political forces, in PSSh led by F. Nano and in PDSh. Led by S. Berisha, and in the form of an ever-present prime minister (Czekalski T. et al. 2009, p. 300) 2 . Th e second question related to the creation of the institution of president was about the determinants of concrete solutions on the systemic basis. Determining the position of the offi ce (in the Albanian conditions, initially strong presidency) was related to several elements. First of all, the political tradition of attributing the head of the state to a strong and oft en unrestricted power is taken as a fact of life. Th e lack of strong parliamentary experience had led to the presumption that the only control centre in the country was the presidency. Th e President's offi ce takeover by Communists brought expectation that the most important offi ce in the state would provide control over the reforms that were being implemented and could maintain power.
Th e last question, related to the implementing institution of the President in the political system, concerns how to create a presidency and how to modify the scope of competence. Th e decision to appoint the presidency was the sole responsibility of the Communist Party. Th is change was an outcome of the negotiations with the opposition in the fi rst democratic government of the socialists. It was an eff ect of the progressing disintegration of the authority of communists and concessions to public requests. In the second stage, modifi cations which extended the power of the president were proposed and introduced by the governing democrats. Th is change was opposed by both the socialist opposition and an increasing number of members of the ruling coalition.
At the last stage the changing of the scope of the president's power was carried out by the Parliament, but they were subject to approval by a constitutional referendum (Czekalski T. et al., 2009, p. 298) . Any revision of the constitution was strongly opposed by democrats, who considered Parliament unrepresentative (this was in line with the general tendency of the democrats to undermine the legitimacy of lost elections (Czekalski T. et al., 2009, p. 295) .
It can be assumed that the political system of the Republic of Albania at the time of Sali Berisha can be described, in line with the defi nition by A. Antoszewski, the parliamentarian with the dominant presidency. Only enormous social-economic problems caused the collapse of Berisha. It contributed to modifying the political system and developing resistance to shocks and increasing adaptability to changing conditions. From the dominant presidential model, the Albanian regime has evolved towards the corrective presidency also described by A. Antoszewski 3 (Antoszewski A., Herbut R., 2006, p. 174) Seeing all these tendencies it can be said that the nature of the Presidency of the President-Creator of Political Will has changed to the President-Arbitrator and Guardian. Changes resulted in the Albanian political system becoming more resistant to disturbance. Strong leadership in developing democracies is, for sure, a dangerous factor, and recourse to more conciliatory methods is a way to overcome the crises. Such a change came out in favour of a young and unproductive Albanian democracy, even aft er changing the style of politics. At the time when Sali Berisha was removed from the government, social protests become less aggressive than before and the political situation was more stable. Albania with such a well-regulated head of state has the chance to meet its goals of integration with the rest of Europe and stabilizing its young democracy 4 . Th e limitation of presidential powers has become an opportunity for the long-term sustainability of the political system in Albania.
Conclusions
Changing the Albanian constitution in 1998 caused a clear reduction of the president's power over the Assembly and the Cabinet of the Prime Minister. Th e strength of the political system has shift ed from a single offi ce to more collegial mechanisms. Th is led to changes primarily in the gradual stabilization of the political system and allowed the emergence from an extremely serious political crisis.
Th e Frye Index expresses the tendency of changes in the head of state position. According to the results of the analysis, the president's position was clearly reduced, by removing the majority of independent decisions, leaving only the Security Council matters -Th is body has only advisory competence. Th e President was also given the opportunity to refer legal acts to the constitutional court, which is only relevant in stabilizing the political system.
Th e institution of the president, even though it was introduced to the political system very quickly, only took shape over the course of time. Th e shaping of the president's position was undoubtedly related to the Sali Berisha and his desire to dominate in political life. Th e initial expansion of the president's power, culminating in a spectacular defeat, resulted in a change of approach and a radical restriction of presidential power. In the process of shaping the offi ce of the president (its implementation) cultural and historical issues have been quite signifi cant, indicating that the only good solution would be to entrust a considerable amount of competence to a single actor. Even aft er the fall of President Berisha, strong leadership continued to play a signifi cant role in the political life of the country, but it was more connected with party leadership.
